Table of Contents

1. Introduction / Alfred R. Mele.
2. The Origins and Development of Our Conception of Free Will / Alison Gopnik and Tamar Kushnir.
3. Free Will without Metaphysics / Andrew E. Monroe and Bertram F. Malle.
4. Free Will: Belief and Reality / Roy Baumeister, Cory Clark, and Jamie Luguri.
5. Measuring and Manipulating Beliefs and Behaviors Associated with Free Will: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly / Jonathan Schooler, Thomas Nadelhoffer, Eddy Nahmias, and Kathleen D. Vohs.
6. Incompatibilism and Bypassed Agency / Gunnar Björnsson.
7. Naturalizing Free Will: Paths and Pitfalls / Myrto I. Mylopoulos and Hakwan Lau.
8. "Free will": Components and Processes / Patrick Haggard.
9. Change of Intention in "Picking" Situations / Ariel Furstenberg, Leon Y. Deouell, and Haim Sompolinsky.
10. On Reporting the Onset of the Intention to Move / Uri Maoz, Liad Mudrik, Ram Rivlin, Ian Ross, Adam Mamelak, and Gideon Yaffe.
11. Dissecting Readiness Potential: an Investigation of the Relationship Between Readiness Potentials, Conscious willing, and Action / Prescott Alexander, Alexander Schlegel, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, Peter Ulric Tse, and Thalia Wheatley.
12. Monkey Decision-Making as a Model System for Human Decision-Making / Adina L. Roskies.
13. The Problem of Determinism and Free Will Is Not the Problem of Determinism and Free Will / Carolina Sartorio.
14. On Being Some-One / J.T. Ismael.
15. Negligent Action and Unwitting Omission / Randolph Clarke.
Appendix: Free Will Lexicon / Patrick Haggard, Alfred Mele, Timothy O'Connor, and Kathleen Vohs.
Index. This volume explores free will from several perspectives: neuroscience; social, cognitive, and developmental psychology; and philosophy (traditional and experimental). It divides into three main units. The psychology and experimental philosophy unit explores how children conceive of free will and how their concept of free will develops, how to measure belief in free will, behavioral effects of lowered or raised confidence in the existence of free will, folk concepts of free will and moral responsibility, and controlled studies of our capacities for things closely associated with free will-for example, capacities to resist temptation. The neuroscience unit discusses various scientific approaches to studying free will and their bearing on philosophical disputes about the nature of free will, brain processes underlying decisions, how the conscious experience of voluntary action might contribute to the neural control of behavior, the causal roles of conscious processes, neural differences between choosing and arbitrary picking, unconscious intentions, change of intention in very short time frames, the time at which proximal decisions are made, and the connection between that time and what people report to be the time at issue. The philosophy unit examines the relevance of studies of decision making in monkeys to human free will, whether determinism is compatible with free will, the bearing of theories of causation on this question about compatibility, arguments for incompatibility that appeal to an "ultimacy" requirement for free will, the nature of willing, the nature of moral responsibility, and blameworthiness for negligent actions and unwitting omissions.