Table of Contents

Preface.
Acknowledgements.
PART I: KNOWLEDGE & EPISTEMIC HUMILITY ; 1. Phenomenal Conservatism and Skeptical Theism ; 2. Phenomenal Conservatism, Skeptical Theism, and Probabilistic Reasoning ; 3. On the Epistemological Framework for Skeptical Theism ; 4. Why Skeptical Theism isn't Skeptical Enough ; 5. Minimal Skeptical Theism ; 6. Replies to Long and Tucker ; 7. The Paradox of Humility and Dogmatism.
PART II: DEBATING CORNEA ; 8. Some Considerations Concerning CORNEA, Global Skepticism, and Trust ; 9. Skeptical Theism and Undercutting Defeat ; 10. Confirmation Theory and the Core of CORNEA ; 11. Skeptical Theism, Abductive Atheology, and Theory Versioning ; 12. Meet the New Skeptical Theism, Same as the Old Skeptical Theism ; 13. Learning not to be Naive: A comment on the exchange between Perrine/Wykstra & Draper.
PART III: SKEPTICAL THEISM'S IMPLICATIONS FOR THEISM ; 14. Skeptical Theism and Skeptical Atheism ; 15. Skeptical Theism, Atheism, and Total Evidence Skepticism ; 16. Skeptical Demonism: A Failed Response to a Humean Challenge ; 17. Divine Deception ; 18. Two New Versions of Skeptical Theism ; 19. Trust, Silence, and Liturgical Acts.
PART IV: SKEPTICAL THEISM'S IMPLICATIONS FOR MORALITY ; 20. Agnosticism, Skeptical Theism, and Moral Obligation ; 21. Agnosticism, the Moral Skepticism Objection, and Commonsense Morality ; 22. Skeptical Theism within Reason Given that we meet evils in every quarter of the world, could it be governed by an all-good and all-powerful deity? Some philosophers say no and claim that the problem of evil is good evidence for atheism. Other philosophers say yes and claim that all of the evils in our world can be explained as requirements for deeper goods. And still other philosophers say yes but demur on the task of explaining the role of evils in our world. Philosophers who believe in God and yet take this latter route are called "skeptical theists." Such thinkers are skeptical about human abilities to determine whether the evils in our world could be justifiably allowed by a being such as God. Despite believing in God, these philosophers insist that humans are not cognitively equipped to discern many of the reasons that might be available to God. This collection of essays presents cutting-edge work on skeptical theistic responses to the problem of evil and the persistent objections that such responses invite. Part I investigates the epistemology of skepticism as it applies to evils and the nature of epistemic humility. Part II explores the tenability of a particular epistemic principle about the conditions of reasonable epistemic access (CORNEA). The remaining sections of the book address objections to sceptical theism, namely the objection that skeptical theism undermines the theistic life (Part III) and the objection that skeptical theism undermines the moral life (Part IV).