Table of Contents

Issues in antitrust enforcement / Vivek Ghosal, Joseph E. Harrington and Johan Stennek.
Remembrance of things past: antitrust, ideology, and the development of industrial economics / Stephen Martin.
The impact of the corporate leniency program on cartel formation and the cartel price path / Joe Chen and Joseph E. Harrington.
Optimal fines in the era of whistleblowers: should price fixers still go to prison? / Paolo Buccirossi and Giancarlo Spagnolo.
Instruments for cartel deterrence, and conflicts of interests / Cécile Aubert.
Lessons for competition policy from the vitamins cartel / William E. Kovacic ... [et al.].
Effectiveness of antitrust sanctions on modern international cartels / John M. Connor.
The economics of tacit collusion: implications for merger control / Marc Ivaldi ... [et al.].
The economics and politics of international merger enforcement: a case study of the GE/Honeywell merger / Jay Pil Choi.
The political economy of EU merger control: small vs. large member states / Henrik Horn and Johan Stennek.
A consumer surplus defense in merger control / Sven-Olof Fridolfsson.
EU merger remedies: an empirical assessment / Tomaso Duso, Klaus Gugler and Burcin Yurtoglu.
The significant impediment of effective competition test in the new European merger regulation: in theory and practice / Jérôme Foncel, Marc Ivaldi and Valérie Rabassa.
Vertical restraints and the effects of upstream horizontal mergers / Luke Froeb, Steven Tschantz and Gregory J. Werden.
Political stabilization by an independent regulator / Antoine Faure-Grimaud and David Martimort.
Saving section 2: reframing U.S. monopolization law / Timothy J. Brennan.
Private antitrust litigation: procompetitive or anticompetitive? / R. Preston McAfee, Hugo M. Mialon and Sue H. Mialon.
Antitrust in open economies / Joseph Francois and Henrik Horn. Motivated by recent events and experiences in antitrust enforcement and policy in the United States and the European Union, and new insights and findings from academic research, this book presents a collection of theoretical, empirical and public policy-oriented articles representing recent research on the political-economy of antitrust. Political-economy is defined broadly to include the demand-side drivers of antitrust activity such as market failures and interest-groups, along with supply-side drivers including ideology and partisan politics as well as the importance of informational limita