Table of Contents

The rise of private regulation in the world economy.
Private nonmarket rule-making in context : a typology of global regulation.
Institutional complementarity theory.
Private regulators in global financial markets : institutional structure and complementarity in accounting regulation.
The politics of setting standards for financial reporting.
Private regulators in global product markets : institutional structure and complementarity in product regulation.
The politics of nuts and bolts[m-]and nanotechnology : ISO and IEC standard-setting for global product markets.
Contributions to the theoretical debates in political science, sociology, law and economics.
Conclusions and implications for global governance.
Appendix 1 financial reporting standards survey : additional survey results.
Appendix 2 product standards survey : additional survey results.
Appendix 3 survey methods. Over the past two decades, governments have delegated extensive regulatory authority to international private-sector organizations. This internationalization and privatization of rule making has been motivated not only by the economic benefits of common rules for global markets, but also by the realization that government regulators often lack the expertise and resources to deal with increasingly complex and urgent regulatory tasks. The New Global Rulers examines who writes the rules in international private organizations, as well as who wins, who loses--and why. Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli exa.