Table of Contents

Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Overview; 1. Descartes' Account of Ideas and the Puzzle of Sensory Representation; 2. Non-Representationalist Solutions: Cartesian Sensations as Qualia; 3. Externalist Solutions: Causal Accounts; 4. Externalist Solutions: Teleofunctional Accounts; 5. A Descriptivist-Causal Account and the Solution of the Puzzle of Sensory Representation; 6. Objections and Replies; Conclusion; References; Index While much has been written on Descartes' theory of mind and ideas, no systematic study of his theory of sensory representation and misrepresentation is currently available in the literature. Descartes and the Puzzle of Sensory Misrepresentation is an ambitious attempt to fill this gap. It argues against the established view that Cartesian sensations are mere qualia by defending the view that they are representational; it offers a descriptivist-causal account of theirrepresentationality that is critical of, and differs from, all other extant accounts (such as, for example, causal, teleofunctio